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Introduction 
The hopes of numerous interested parties, including residents and related organizations, are 
included in the administrative proces&s carried out by local government. The conflict of 
interest and cooperation among them directly affects the pditical processes. This inclusion in 
the processes of the wishes of vested interests is the essence of self government. The Mayor, 
members of the City Council, and municipalofficials determine a wide range of issues and 
implement different policies on hhalf of residents and related organizations. However, some 
policies conflict with each other. In a democratic society, conflict is bound to occur, since 
vested interests are not a monolith and their interests are different. 
People with different interests oppose each other. One role of the administration is to mediate 
interests, achieve compromises, or determine needs and give priority based on the degree of 
need. However, in some cases, mediation, compromise, and prioritization are all inapplicable . 
This is when policieswhich absolutely cannot compromise with each other compete.
The conflict between industrial development and landscape preservation is a typical example 
of this kind. Industrial development involves constructing new buildings, and orating roads 
and bridges to improve access. Large empty plots may be prepared to attract corporations. 
Landscape preservation, on the other hand, involves maintaining the present state as much as 
possible, although there may be some modifications. Thesetwo policies are both important, 
but they cannot share the same time and space. 
Conflicts between these two policies are most obviously seen inthe city of Kyoto. It is one of 
the oldest Japanese cities, more specifically, the second oldest city in Japan after Nara. Its 
foundations were laid about 1,200 years ago, and it still contains many historic buildings. 
There are also numerous areas registered as World Cultural Heritage sites. On the other hand, 
Kyoto City is also a large metropolis with a popuhtion of about 1.5 million, with many 
modern buildings. The metropolitan area, which includes Kyoto City and its surrounding 
regions, supports a population of more than 2 million people. Kyoto City is a "cabinetorder 
designated city" and thus has an administrative organ as a metropolis with equivalent power 
to a Prefecture. Many major Japanese corporations are also located in Kyoto City. Notably,
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the headquarters of world famous corporations including Rohm, Nintendo, Murata 
Manufacturing, and Kyocera are located in the central area, partly due to convenient transport 
links. 
The head-on confrontation between the above two policies has been makingthe city of Kyoto 
face an extremely difficult situation in its administrative process. The administration 
recognizes that landscape needs to be conserved, but on the other hand, industries must be 
developed. These two aspects need to be achieved simultaneously. However, it is difficult to 
achieve both in the same area. As described below, political strugglesover the landscape 
have occurred repeatedly in the past, but ended half-resolved every time. Preservation was 
not fully achieved, and development was also impeded. As a result, the landscape has been 
progressively damaged. 
Since Kyoto is an old city, landscape preservation is considerably important. For example, 
laws and ordinances require the conservation of temples and shrines and their surrounding 
areas in the suburbs, and restrict construction fnew houses and modifications. Only lowrise 
buildings can be constructed in these areas. In the central area (north of Kyoto Station), no 
buildings higher than 45 m are allowed to be built. However, planning policy is often 
determined reactively rather than proactively. A particular area ispreserved, but a modern 
urban area overshadows it. Modern buildings are seen from thepreserved area. In particular, 
in the central area, low rise town houses lined up along the streets in the old days (this itself 
was a beautiful scene), but now these town houses are only randomly dotted between modern 
buildings. This is no longer beautiful scenery with respect to landscape. In other words, old 
scenery remains in one-dimensional dots and lines, but not two-dimensionally as areas. (Note 
1) 
Other cities of Japan also face similar dilemmas between conflicting policies, but Kyoto City 
administration has been more seriously embracing this contradiction because it clearly has 
two faces: one of the oldest cities in Japan, and a typical modem city. This dilemma has been 
distorting and delaying the administrative procests. For example, if landscape preservation 
is given priority, no new industries can be developed. The result is that revenue from fixed 
asset tax falls compared with other large cities. In fact, Kyoto's revenue from fixed asset 
taxes is extremely low compared to that in other cities (Note 2). To increase tax revenue, 
industrial development needs to be prioritized. As a result, the landscape will be damaged. 
This can be called antinomy.
Factors specific to Kyoto 
So, why did conflict between landscape preservation and industrial development policies 
become more serious in Kyoto City than in other cities? Naturally, other cities also experience
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similar conflicts to differing extents. In the case of Kyoto City, however, the following 
factors can be found in addition to its being a city with a long history.
  Factor 1) Geographical restrictions 
  First, the geographical conditions of the City of Kyoto have exacerbated the problem. Kyoto 
  is enclosed on three sides by mountains taller than 500 m (in ancient days, this configuration 
  was considered propitious). Accordingly, the southern area is the only land that can be newly 
  developed. In addition, Kyoto City is the only metropolitan city in Japan with a populalon of 
  over 1 million that is not facing the sea. To expand the city area, the mountains would need to 
  be leveled. If the mountain area is developed, it can be used for residential land, but not for 
  the central area. For reasons of cost, the leveled area cannot be used for factory sites. 
  Compared to other large cities, Kyoto City is located in an area without developable 
  peripheral regions. 
  For example, Kobe City has contrasting geographical features. Kobe (now in debt but once 
  an ideal model of urban management) reclaimed areas on the coastline with sand obtained by 
  leveling mountainous areas, creating new urban areas. In the case of Kyoto City, to enable 
  development, old urban areas must be continuously demolished and rebuilt. It would have 
  been impossible for Kyoto to both preserve its old cityscape and build a new urban area. By 
  necessity, old town houses were destroyed and replaced with highrise buildings. If Kyoto 
  was located in the center of a plain, and had a coastal area, the entire ancient urban area might 
  have been preserved. 
  In reality, Kyoto has flat lands only to the South. The previous urban development plan 
  divided the city into northern and southern regions and tried to foster development in the 
  southern region. The southern area was indeed developed for industrial sites, but offices are 
  still clustered in the northern region, which has more convenient transport links (Note 3). 
  There is also a plan to transfer the city hall to a new highrise building in the southern region. 
  However, the present stringent financial conditions may hinder this plan from being realized.
Factor 2) Giving every department a hand in making decisions, i.e., the administrative culture 
of decentralized policy-making 
Japanese local governments are often described as "department s ores" or "supermarkets," 
since all the departments involved in administrative s rvices are located in the same one city 
hall (Note 4) containing departments hat cover all the services that residents require, 
including civilian sevices, commerce, civil engineering and construction, water and sewerage, 
city transport, education, and other public services. All these are provided by one local 
government except for a few exceptional services provided through associations and broader
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local government. Including these exceptions, ome say that a local government behaves as 
one large conglomerate (Note 5). 
This means that everything related to public services is examined, determined, and 
implemented as one organization. In other words, one local government must determine and 
implement conflicting policies. Accordingly, when problems occur which basically oppose 
each other, such as landscape preservation and industrial development, it takes time for 
internal adjustments obe made. If discussions take place frankly and openly, arguments may 
continue ndlessly, ultimately causing interdepartment a agonism. The more complicated 
the issue, the greater the inability of the city to come up with consistent policies. 
To avoid confusion, each department in the city government avoids interfering with other 
departments. The Mayor just ratifies policies after the fact. This is called the "department 
oriented principle" (or genkyoku-shugi in Japanese). The idea is to avoid interfering with 
other departments if internal coordination would take up a lot of time. Each department has a 
interest group which do strong lobbying activities, and therefore other departments do not 
interfere with decisions that are made byofficials after consulting with interest groups. 
The power of the Mayor of the City of Kyoto is somewhat circumscribed, as described in the 
next section. Policies are made separately on the initiative of each department. A political 
culture of traditionally giving importance to decisi ns made by departments has long been 
cultivated (Note 6). Compared to other cities, Kyoto City has a notable habit of implementing 
decentralized decision-making.
Factor 3) Insufficient leadership by the Mayor 
In the Japanese local government system, there is only one local government in each region, 
unlike in the U.S. Only the Mayor and City Council members are selected by election. This 
means that most decision-making power rests in the democratically elected Mayor. If the 
governing party in the City Council is in the majority, the Mayor can in most cases see his 
wishes translated into policy. Under these conditions, the Mayor is almost a king. 
However, in the case of the City of Kyoto, the Mayor often lacks this power (Note 7). In 
recent years, there has been only one Mayor who has served three terms and others served for 
two terms or retired halfway. Only a few Mayors can maintain their power for long. 
Accordingly, the authority of the Mayor's staff to integrate and coordinate plans is impeded. 
If the Mayor cannot maintain his post, the power of the general staffing management 
department is further weakened. It is said that if past Mayors had been able to demonstrate a 
specific direction on landscape preservation, carrying through their convictions, Kyoto might 
have been able to maintain its attraction as an ancient capital. 
In addition, the political situation of Kyoto further weakens the power of the Mayor.
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Landscape preservative and innovative forces for development are equally balanced in Kylo. 
Since the governing party does not have a stable majority in the City Council, the Mayor's 
power has been undermined. The recent Mayors are politically based towards Conservative 
Parties, but there were also past Mayors supported by the Communist Party. The Mayor 
naturally makes decisions based on political considerations. Decision is made based on most 
advantageous characteristic for being elected as Mayor. In general, innovative forces stress 
the importance of fostering traditional industries and landscape preservation. Conservative 
Parties place importance on building an infrastructure for industrial development. Since the 
war, Kyoto has always been managed between these matching forces. The Mayor always 
tries to win by gaining the support of moderate forces and thus avoids making politically 
extreme decisions: The Mayor avoids making clear statements on any political agenda that 
two forces severely oppose.
Factor 4) Intricate interests 
In large cities, different interests are generally in coiflict and the City of Kyoto is no 
exception. A wide variety of vested interests are also seen in Kyoto. There are financial 
circles, labor associations, and welfare associations. These are interest groups or lobbying 
groups. The municipal administration is a product of the balance of political influences of 
these parties. Political dynamics of merging and balancing exist here. Kyoto has, more than 
other cities, been managed based on a sensitive political balance between conservativeand 
progressive parties, as described above. The administration has to be sensitive to this balance. 
Moreover, Kyoto has vested interests, uch as shrines/temples and tourist agencies, not seen in 
other large cities. In particular, the latent influence of those related b shrines/temples is very 
strong, and they sometimes have enough influence to change the course of policymaking. (In 
fact, a new tax on shrines/temples was withdrawn due to opposition by these groups. 
Although it was not the only reason, the Mayor at that ime did not run for the next mayoral 
election.) (Note 8) 
The balance among forces, rather than one prominent force, is the key here. Each municipal 
department clearly presents their case, and the Mayor has been supported by the balance of 
these cases. The Mayor gives a balanced opinion on both landscape preservation and 
industrial development. Past Mayors have been keen on fostering industry because they can 
gain the support of business circles. However, the Mayor still has to be sensitive to which 
way the wind blows. If public opposition to development becomes tronger, the Mayor will 
try to take this into account. 
Factor 5) Indifference ofordinary citizens
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The City of Kyoto is large. About 1.5 million people live in its cramped space. Most ofthe 
residents live as urban citizens, and wish to enjoy a convenient lifestyle. They wish to live 
more conveniently than at present, and thus policies for fulfilling these expectations, i.e., 
development, will be launched. Living in Kyoto is somewhat inonvenient compared to other 
cities with high-rise buildings: this image still underlies residents' views (Note 9). However, 
investment in city planning is behind the times compared to other cities, and ordinary citizens 
are extremely non-politicized. For many citizens, preservation of their ancient capital is low 
on their list of priorities, with few citizens feeling that it is important. 
Opposition movements against development have been perceived as a problem limited to 
those living nearby or as run byprofessional activists trying to encourage preservation. Most 
citizens have not taken up the movement as a cause. One typical example is opposition to the 
construction of a waste treatment site. Many citizens appear to find the self-serving nature of 
local opposition more distasteful than destruction of the landscape. Citizens also feel that 
they may be drawn into a political struggle if they participate in any kind of opposition 
movement. 
Accordingly, landscape preservation is unlikely to become part cf the mainstream political 
agenda. The Mayor and Council members seldom include landscapepreservation in their 
commitments. They are more interested in other interest groups who are more capable of 
generating votes. Since landscape preservation does not lead to the harvesting of votes, the 
Mayor and council members do not often show much interest in it. 
In summary, the above five factors prevent landscape preservation from being handled as an 
important part of the political agenda. Kyoto, a city which needs to preserve its historically 
significant landscape, has gradually moved towards destroying it.
Interested parties in local government 
Kyoto's geographical features and the fact of its being a metropolitan city are preconditions 
that cannot be changed. If there were more vacant lots and a lower population, there would be 
more options for environmental preservation. However, this will never happen inthe City of 
Kyoto. 
To think about the influence on the decision making process of political issues, me need to 
assume a wide range of vested interests and examine their movements as actors involved in 
the political agenda. 
The first actor is the Mayor. The Mayor's position and opinion has decisive importance. The 
second actor is the City Hall which folbws, but thinks and acts separately from the elected 
Mayor. In particular, managers such as heads of departments may make the decision 
themselves when the responsibility arrives at their department. The third actor is vested
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interests which directly. or indirectly influence the municipal administration. These can also 
be called interest groups which do lobbying activities around local governments, as stated 
above. For Example, they are Kyoto Business Association, Kyoto Labor Association, Kyoto 
Medical Association and so on. City staff other than managers form also an interest group 
called a staff union to exert influence on the municipal administrative processes. A fourth 
actor is the members of the City Council. They often act in acquiescence to the ldhbying 
groups, but they sometimes also act on behalf of political parties or in the interests of general 
citizens, as described. below. The fifth actor is the citizens. They may also participate in 
lobbying activities. Some citizens are organized into pditical parties, for example, religious 
parties and the Communist Party. Grassroots conservationists act together with independent 
conservative council members. However, there are many more citizens who take no action. 
They are described as general citizens in the abstract. They sometimes exert an influence on 
the municipal administration. These general citizens are called unaffiliated voters at election 
times, and have a greater influence on the success of candidates in larger election districts. 
Unaffiliated voters may in some cases account for over 30% of the total. The Mayor is thus 
very sensitive to the behavior of unaffiliated voters at election times. 
The above five actors influence the decisionmaking process in the city. It is similar to 
playing a complicated power game. However, each actor, other than the Mayor, is not a 
single character that can make decisions logically. They are mass groups. Since the mass 
plays power games, its direction is unpredictable. Interest groups, council members, and 
citizens compete for influence inside and outside City Hall. Since they are complicatedly 
intertwined, it is almost impossible to find an appropriate and logical solution when 
determining policies. If one politically advantageous group is formed and this group can 
have a dominant influence, discussions may be ultimately made to suit this group. However, 
this is rare. In many cases, chaotic discussions continue while each interestgroups try to 
secure its interest in an area that does not undermine others' interests. As a whole, the system 
has so much inertia that it is unlikely to make a definite move in any direction. A huge 
elephant cannot move to any direction.
The dynamics of decisionmaking in the City of Kyoto 
How the above factors and actors meet and how decisions are made is described next. 
Although the City of Kyoto is a municipality, it has authority equivalent to a Prefecture, since 
it is a Designated City. For example, the City of Kyoto does not receive instructions from 
Kyoto Prefecture, the next layer of government, when planning city development . 
Accordingly, an in-house-developed city development plan can be implemented at its own 
discretion much more dynamically than in other small cities and towns. This means that the
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Mayor, each department, city staff, council members, andinterest groups can incorporate heir 
interest in the plan independently of the views of central government and Kyoto Prefecture. 
Because of this discretion, the City of Kyoto shows a unique process in making decisions due 
to the above factors. As already described, Kyoto City traditionally gives a great deal of 
discretional uthority to each department. This is similar to other large cities, although its 
degree may differ. There is unwritten agreementthat no department should intervene in a 
decision made by another department in large cities Accordingly, the opinion of each 
department is afforded respect. In particular, with the weakening of the leadership of the 
Mayor of Kyoto, a decision making process has been built which requires the Mayor not to 
interfere with the intentions and interest of each department. 
Specific administrative services are determined by each department, not just landscape 
preservation and industrial development. Constructhn is determined by the Construction 
Department, welfare by Welfare, commerce and industry by Commerce and Industry, and so 
on. An interest complex of creeks centering on each department, interest groups, citizens 
involved in lobbies, and council membersi.e., the second, third, fourth, and some of the fifth 
actors (forming political obbies), is built. The department discusses with the relevant vested 
interests when determining the details. In the case of new proposals, the person in charge 
creates a proposal (ringi), and circulates it for approval among their direct superiors and 
managers of related epartments. If everyone approves itin each department, the proposal is 
accepted. The ringi system is a participative decisionmaking method unique to Japan. 
Even though one policy is agreed in one department, policies that may conflict between 
departments may be implemented without adjustment. For example, in an extreme case, one 
department implements policies to preserve an old town while another department makes a 
plan to build a highway nearby (Note 10). Naturally, a chogi (a management meeting at 
which the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and Department Managers make major decisions) is 
periodically held, and comments on decisions made by other departments may banade, but 
not to the extent of overturning their decisions. The Mayor also often rubber-stamps the 
decision. A comparison survey of decisionmaking inDesignated Cities also shows that he 
Mayor has less practical power in Kyoto City Hall than in othercities (Note 11), whereas the 
financial department is extremely strong. The financial department may rejectfinancially 
impractical plans, but the Mayor does not often have an official opportunity to reverse the 
decision. 
However, decision-making asdescribed above is ideal when a creek or interest complex does 
not interfere with any other interest. If each department has different interestgroups, and has 
an agenda that may cause serious conflict between departments in a local government, 
problems will wise. In particular, landscape preservation (the department i  charge of culture
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and tourism) and industrial development (the department in charge of public projects) easily 
reach agreement within their respective departments. Moreover, the decision is ®nsidered as 
correct in each department. However, if the issue is discussed publicly to determine the basic 
missions of the City Hall, a basic conflict will be revealed. 
Policy coordination is implemented in advance by the Mayor, general staff belongingot the 
Mayor, or within the planning coordination department. However, the Planning Department, 
which is a fixed item in other cities, is constantly being abolished and ra,-stablished in Kyoto 
City. The tradition of strong power of departments is also a result of an internal idea that 
there is no need for a staff department directly belonging to the Mayor. In fact, Mayors who 
have demonstrated strong leadership in the past have had a very active planning coordination 
department (Note 12). 
The Mayor's strong leadership is needed to integrate opinions to some extent if any mismatch 
occurs. This is because the departments and vested interest groups involved cannot view the 
issues objectively: their interests are complicatedly involved. They may arrange tradffs, but 
policies cannot be fundamentally integrated. Only the Mayor can give priority to such 
policies. In the past, some Mayors were capable, and some not. If the Mayor cannot play this 
role, the municipal administrationprocesses tarto wander off course. 
In addition, in the case of Kyoto City, people occasionally unite under one "Kyoto citizens' 
identity." Ordinary citizens are like sand, with nothing that can be clearly defined. Unless a 
political struggle rears up or develops into a major isaie that affects the entire city, general 
citizens have no role to play. However, when a problem comes into focus, citizens' pride of 
living in the ancient capital is awakened. Once they become aware of the crisis of identity of 
Kyoto, public opinion often unites in one direction. Also, in the past, when a political 
problem looms, general citizens' protests became loud only in the final stage. In this case, 
council members and the Mayor, who are sensitive to their electoral situation, can be moved 
to change their minds. 
Ordinary citizens are normally hidden behind regional elites (regional coordinators such as 
chairmen of neighborhood associations) andinterest groups. Regional elites also emphasize 
their individual interests, and thus are not capable of exerting a significant influence on the 
administrative processes. Although they oppose the construction of roads and buildings for 
reasons of preserving the landscape, their actions are often regarded as local egoism. 
Industrial development gets the support of all citizens, but local preservation movements are 
often not universally approved. In order to increase their influence, citizens' groups join 
several interest groups. 
In recent years, active citizens as distinct from citizens represented by regimal elites are 
gaining more influence on municipal administration. In the Mayoral election, the persuasive
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effects of these citizens form an important factor. Ordinary citizens share a potential sense of 
value when it comes to protecting the ancient capital. If any problems occur, they readily 
unite under this sense of value. 
However, since this rise of Kyoto citizens occurs only at the late stage of an incident, the 
situation is already very serious. Accordingly, in many cases, significant destructiomf the 
environment has already taken place. Landscape preservation is positioned at the periphery 
compared to other administrative policies. Citizens have a broad interest inpreservation but 
do not often think seriously about it. Its priority is low in policy-making since there is a lack 
of political parties that earnestly stress the importance of landscape preservation. Even if an 
interested party exists, it has little influence. 
With respect o landscape preservation in Kyoto, it attracts attention as a major political issue 
suddenly once the issue becomes important and general citizens become aware of it, in a 
process similar to waking up a sleeping lion. Once the movement starts, citizens' interest 
rises sharply over a broad area. In this sense, landscape preservation is an unpredictable 
element in the political agenda. Once interest has spread, the Mayor may be pressed to make 
decisions that threaten his political survival. 
In other words, landscape preservation in Kyoto suddenly becomes an inflanmable political 
issue once it passes a certain trigger value. In this case, citizens' movements start 
dynamically, many citizens become aware of their identity as Kyoto citizens, and they 
strongly support landscape preservation. At this point, council members who were previously 
supportive of the Mayor may now express opposition. As the political issues expand, the 
entire administrative processes lean more and more toward landscape preservation. 
However, few movements reached this point. There are regulations that create various 
restrictions, but most are ignored. Land is cleared or buildings are constructed without 
permission. Landscape is gradually being destroyed, and will end up in destroying the entire 
landscape of Kyoto. 
Ultimately, the result depends on the first actor, the Mayor and fifth actor, citizens, and when 
and how they exercise their power. This will allow policies that reconcile environmental 
preservation and economic development which by their nature do not get along well. 
Conversely, if neither the Mayor nor general citizens pay sufficient attention, municipal 
departments will implement developmentpolicies on one hand and preservation policies on 
the other, resulting in spot and linear preservation but not area preservation. This is what has 
actually been happening. 
The City of Kyoto has experienced major problems related to landscape preservation. For 
example, construction of Kyoto Tower hotel, the illegal housing land development known as 
Mohican Mountain, construction of a golf course in a landscape conservation area, and the
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rebuilding of the Kyoto Hotel as a high-rise building. Each went through a unique and 
complicated process, but in general, they showed the same pattern of pre-emptive 
development by contractors, delayed action by the administrative organs, and resulting 
disorder inside city hall. These issues have left serious problems within the Kyoto 
administrative processes, for which regret has been repeatedly expressed. 
One typical example of direct confrontation between preservation and development is the 
reconstruction of the Station Building, described below. 
The Reconstruction of Kyoto Station Building 
This is a large building, the largest in the City of Kyoto, located at the boundary of the 
southern and northern regions of Kyoto. It has been often described as a huge wall separating 
the northern and southern regions. The building has multiple purposes, including a railway 
terminal, parking lot, theater, department store, and exhibition hall. Concerning its 
construction, arguments naturally occurred, by those in favor to those opposed discussing 
whether the building is appropriate for Kyoto. It was indeed an incident in which 
preservation and development confronted each other face to face. The history of this incident 
is described next (Note 13). 
The reconstruction f Kyoto Station (originally built in 1952),which isthe entrance to Kyoto 
City, was examined. It was already run down, and a desire to construct anew building grew 
in both Kyoto City Hall and Kyoto business circles. In 1989, a company for reconstruction 
was provisionally established. The overheating of the economy (later called the "bubble 
economy" period) at that time created a new idea for further discussion. The idea was to 
build a 130-m high-rise station building. A plan to invite a department s ore was also 
included. Business circles and conservative parties were enthusiastic about his plan. 
However, an opposition movement started in the local area. Their opposition was based on 
the need to protect existing small companies. At this point, many other citizens regarded the 
movement objectively as simple selfishness on the part of local people. Soon, however, the 
people opposing the plan increased ue to the possibility of the landscapebeing destroyed. 
As time passed, more and more citizens' groups tarted to oppose the plan, and the position of 
anti-development groups become gradually clear. Furthermore, the Kyoto Lawyers' 
Association also opposed the plan, and started litigation. 
At this stage, the administration (in particular, departments related to the economy that 
favored development) clearly tried to promote a high-rise building in cooperation with 
business circles. The City Council also intended to ride on this trend. At first,only the 
Communist Party opposed a high-rise building. Soon, however, the City Council, goaded by 
citizens' movements, started to take a critical position against the administration. By 1991,
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most groups were critical of the Kyoto Station plan. They started to oppose the opinion of the 
Mayor. At this stage, the political issue of landscapepreservation was publicly discussed, and 
the views of general citizens attracted attention (some point out that he unattractive image of 
the Kyoto Tower Hotel still remains in the potential consciousness of many citizens (Note 
14)). In the Mayoral Election, a Communist party candidate opposing construction collected 
only 300 fewer votes than then Mayor Tanabe. This led to critical feelings on the part of the 
municipal staff and City Council, who found themselves no longer fully in favor of the plan. 
Business circles, on the other hand, chose this time to declare their wish to see a complete 
removal of the height restrictions in Kyoto City. They succeeded in abolisling the 45-m 
restriction, and further aimed to abolish the restriction itself. The administration, and the 
Mayor in particular, at first supported this plan. However, as citizens' grassroots movements 
became more active, they showed more caution about high-rise building. 
In spring 1991, a competition was held to collect designs for the building. Two designs were 
eventually selected, 59.8 m and 120 m in height. The screening process was held 
independently of the city, and the Mayor started to suggest that he chosen design be "suitable 
for Kyoto," clearly distancing himself rom business circles. As a result, a design under 60 m 
in height was selected. According to Professor Hiroshi Murakami of Ritsumeikan University, 
"a relatively gentle work that is intermediate b tween the pro-development and pro-landscape 
preservation groups was selected." (Note 15). 
At the initial stages in the decision making processes, the wishes of business circles and 
corporations eemed to take precedence, and the administration, particularly those 
departments involved in business issues, took part in announcing the plan and taking the 
initiative. However, an opposing citizens' movement flared up, and the City Council joined it 
in response. Finally, the Mayor also started to be prudent. A competition was held among 
specialists, and a station building, which is not low but not too high, was constructed, taking 
the middle course. 
The Station building was completed in 1997, and opened in September ofthat year. Although 
the building is somewhat alienated from the other buildings in Kyoto City, it was able not to 
undermine the image of "an ancient capital without incongruous skyscrapers," according to 
Professor Murakami(Note 16).
Some Suggestions and Conclusions 
The administrative processes on the City of Kyoto have for some time been pointing out its 
limits in making policies based on tourism. Tourists are decreasing in number, and thus the 
administration and citizens are increasingly focusing their attention on promoting indstrial 
development. However, there are still many who insist in giving more stress on landscape
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preservation. COP3( The 3rd Session of Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate) was held in Kyoto in 1997, and the number of NPOs 
(non-profit organizations) that support landscape preservation grew rapidly around that time. 
These NPOs also have a very strong influence on the environmental administration of the city. 
Citizens are also paying more attention to landscape preservation. This has made antinomy 
more obvious when drawing up administrative policies.
What can be proposed to future Kyoto administrative processes? 
Strong leadership on the part of the Mayor is needed. It is necessary to create a system that 
thoroughly reflects the philosophy of the Mayor concerning environmental issues in actual 
policies. This movement affects the actions taken by the city hall. If the Mayor cannot 
mediate between actions taken by each department, and bidirectional actions continue to be 
taken, contradicting policies will be implemented simultaneously b  the entire city hall (Note 
17). If the Mayor just stresses the importance of reaching an agreement, no remarks to 
support either side can be made. To avoid revealing conflicts many policies containing 
internal contradictions will be implemented. As a result, the redevelopment of the town will 
go ahead, but preservation of town scenery will proceed in parallel. Old town houses will 
remain between modern buildings, creating adisjointed effect. This is what will happen if no 
changes are made in the present form of municipal administration. 
By nature, the conflict between landscape preservation and industrial development derives 
from the fact that one is a philosophical idea and the other is a more specific idea that gives an 
image of future affluence. Preservation is difficult unless there is significant interest on the 
part of citizens. The Mayor's political attitude is often the key to preservation. In addition, 
how ordinary citizens who regard landscape preservation as important participate in the 
decision making process is significant. This means that in Japan, administrative r form is 
quite easy if the leadership of the head based on strong belief is directly connectedwith 
general citizens, allowing concerted moves in one direction, and superseding the decision 
making process of the administrative system. In fact, Mie Prefecture is a typical example of 
administrative reform (Note 18) of this kind. 
With respect to the decision making processes in regional administration, we must consider 
what kind of organizational system is required for determining the city's basic direction. For 
this purpose, the biggest point of contention is how to educate general citizens to consider the 
interest of the entire city, transcending "interest creeks" among departments, council members, 
and interest groups, to ultimately have an influence on election of the Mayor. One new role 
for grassroots movement by citizens' groups--as a counterbalance to existing specialinterest 
complexes-also needs to be considered.
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Notes 
1) According to "Tourist city as living space - Kyoto City Tourism Report" (1997) by 
  Professor Tomohiro Okada of Kyoto University, more than half of Kyoto citizens 
  answered that the town scene in Kyoto has become less beautiful. There is also the 
  following recent article: "Overseas visitors to Kyoto are impressed by the temples and 
  shrines, but are distressed by the chaotic townscape not worthy of an ancient capital, 
  where electric ables are exposed and historic buildings are demolished to make room for 
  office blocks." This is an articletitled "Another viewpoint of tourism: Pride in one's home 
  country, the basic for making attractive points such as landscape conservation."in Nikkei 
  Morning Newspaper (February 22, 2003). 
2) See "Summary of Kyoto City Financial Administration," 10-11.Kyoto City Information 
  2002. 
3) Kyoto City Hall is active in developing South region, but the plan is not making a good 
  progress because Kyoto does not have its own land like Kobe City. - An interview with 
  Mr. Yoshio Mineno, a municipal staff. 
4) See "Prospect of a characteristic for a management process in local government,"Kyoto 
  Prefectural University Bulletin 1981,33,124-139, by Masao Tao. Japan does not have a 
  system of special district as in the U.S. As a general rule, all services are included in one 
  local government. 
5) A remark on city management made by the former MayorTatsuo Miyazaki of Kobe City. 
  This is also applicable to other cities in some sense. 
6) In Kyoto City, "Mayor has to largely depend on city officials in budget planning, making 
  it difficult for Mayor to take the initiative." in "Budget planning in local government" by 
  Yoshio Mineno, Leviathan 1995, 16,145-168 inJapanese. 
7) With respect to the weak leadership of the Mayor, this trend became more obvious after 
  Mayor Motoki Funahashi (1971-1981) who started to give importance on departments. 
  According to a report by Professor M. Muramatsu of Kyoto University (Chapter 9-I: 
  "Mayor and administrative organ") in "Dynamics of Kyoto City administration 
  (Yuhikaku)" (1981), Mayor Funahashi demonstrated a strong leadership, but not 
  subsequent Mayors. Rather, the words of departments became strong since then. 
8) See "Actions of local government under restrictions of the central government," Policy 
  Science (Ritsumeikan University) 1997,. 4(2),37-47 (in Japanese), by Yoshio Mineno, 
  which describes about Kyoto City. 
9) See "Historical city and landscape issues: Eyes for Kyoto identity and Sociology in 
  historical environment" by Hirosike Noda (Compiled by Arata Katagiri, 2000, Shinyo-
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  sha) 
10) This process is very political. Mr. Mineno perceives it as a political model in the 
  aforementioned report. This can be explained by irrational decisionmaking model such 
  as a model of garbage-can. 
11) "Policies in large cities and awareness of municipal staff, based on a comparative 
  administration survey," Kyoto City Report, 1993, by Hiroshi MurakamkProfessor f 
  Ritsumeikan University) Tatsushi Mayama Professor of Doshisya University), and Masao 
  Tao 
12) With respect to a transition of planning and coordination, "General plan and the planning 
  coordination department" by Professor Masashi Kimimura of Doshisya University(in 
  "Dynamics of Kyoto Policies edited by Professor Ichiro Mi
yake and Professor Michio 
  Muramatsu, 1981, Chapter 9-II) 
13) This processes refer to "Landscape administration and policymaking process in Kyoto," 
  Urban Problems 1993, 84(4),71-97 and "Kyoto Station Building leaping in the 2f 
  century?" (1998) in The Manuscript Report by Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University (in 
  Japanese) by Tomohiro Okada. Related articles are also included in KUr, A (2001) Dogs 
  and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Japan, Hill and Wang. They are negative views. 
14) Interviews to several people in charge at that ime. 
15) See "Landscape administration and policymaking processes on Kyoto," Urban Problems, 
  1993,84(4),71-97.(in Japanese) 
16) See "Environmental Policy and the Problems of Rebuilding of New Terminal Station in 
  Kyoto City" in Local Autonomy and Urban Policies on Japan (in Japanese) by Hiroshi 
  Murakami.2003 Horitsu-bunkasya.(in Japanese) 
17) In 1997, the City of Kyoto established a committee for administrative and financial 
  reform. I was one of the committee members, and experienced a course of discussion. 
  With regard to the basic concept of the entire city, an abstract future image was discussed 
  in the first half. With regard to a specific plan in the latter half, most of proposals from 
  departments were listed. When proposals may conflict, bah were listed. The basic plan 
  indeed includes bi-directional ctions. 
18) Former Governor Masayasu Kitagawa of Kyoto Prefecture introduced New Public 
  Management, and tried to reform administrative system by destroying conventional 
  relations among interested parties. The Mayor used a method to directly appeal to 
  prefectural citizens.
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